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Martinez v. State, 88 P.3d 825 (Nev. 2004)1
CRIMINAL LAW - RESTITUITION
Summary
Gina Martinez appealed a district court order denying her motion for return of
money deposited as bail.
Disposition
The Supreme Court of Nevada (“the court”) held that the district court lacked
statutory authority to apply the cash bail deposited by Martinez for criminal defendant
Patrick O’Kelly as restitution for his crimes.
Factual & Procedural History
In August of 2000, a criminal complaint was filed in Las Vegas Justice’s Court
against O’Kelly on the charge of theft. The Las Vegas Justice’s Court bound O’Kelley
over to the district court, and transferred the cash bail to the district court. At O’Kelley’s
arraignment he filed a guilty plea agreement that stated he would forfeit $5,038 $6,000 of
the cash bail he owed as restitution for crimes that he had committed. The district court
then set O’Kelly’s sentencing date, but he failed to appear. Subsequently, the district
court issued a bench warrant for his arrest, and sent Martinez a notice that the cash
deposit would be forfeited.
After O’Kelley’s arrest and sentencing, pursuant to the plea agreement, the money
was to be used as restitution. Martinez, represented by an attorney, moved for the return
of the bail money. However, the district court refused her request, and Martinez
appealed.
Discussion
The court was then presented with the question of whether the district court was
authorized to apply the cash bail, which was a question of first impression for the Nevada
court.2 However, the court found that across the country, in many different jurisdictions,
courts do not have inherent authority to apply cash bail to pay a fine, costs or restitution.3
Citing to an Illinois case, where their Court of Appeals held that cash bail deposit
by a third party may be applied to restitution, the court was quick to point out that there
was an Illinois statute which specifically granted that appeals court the authority to do
so.4
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Martinez, 88 P.3d at 826.
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Id. at 826. See also State v. Nath, 137 Idaho 712, 52 P.3d 857 (Nev. 2002); State v. Centarowski, 166
Wis.2d 700, 480 N.W.2d 790 (Ct. App. 1992).
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Turning to Nevada’s statute, the court found that allow the State’s law allows for
using bail money for fines and costs, no statutory provision authorizes the use of bail
money for the purposes of restitution.5 Furthermore the court found that Nevada’s
statutes did not put Martinez on notice that the money she put up on O’Kelley’s behalf
might be applied in such a way. Thus, although the district court may have been
authorized to use the bail money to pay a fine or costs, it lacked statutory authority to
apply the money towards his ordered restitution.6
Conclusion
The district court erred in applying the bail money posted by Martinez to pay
O’Kelley’s restitution obligation.7 Thus, the court reversed the district court’s order, and
remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion.
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